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ABSTRACT
Modern romantic love is contemplated in association with industrial forms of production and
labour. Attention is paid to the ways in which women are industrialisation’s automatic
operatives par excellence, as well as the subjects and objects of love.
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Introduction
This essay considers love as a symbol represented by
the heart, which is also the organ first used to define
the term automatic. Love’s value as a symbol will be
linked to certain forms of automation that indicate
the dematerialisation of love’s labour and its qualities
as a form of life. Key here is the understanding that
love’s labours are most often associated with the
figure of woman and in understanding automaticity
as dispensing with causality.
We explore forms of automation characteristic of
nineteenth century industrialization, through exam-
ples of speaking automata, romantic literature and
labour. In the first instance, automata are seen to
represent those with least power in Western societies,
whose ventriloquized presence indicated a propensity
for imitation and repetition. These automata can be
seen to evince the magical absorption and disappear-
ance of actual bodies and materials into systems of
automation. Thereby, as Esther Leslie and Helen
Hester have put it respectively, automated devices
appear more animate than their operators or the
bodies that they eventually replace (Leslie 2002;
Hester 2016). For Marx, it was this quality of liveli-
ness that characterised the commodity, being a repo-
sitory for living labour that was associated with the
vigorous, animate qualities of love (Marx 1990, 302).
While according to Max Weber (2009), love’s anima-
tion functions as the “real”, vital force and promise
that propels workers to accept the rational banality
and routine of industrial working life. In this respect,
love is an essential part of capital’s calculation and
subjection to systems of automation.
In claiming that isolating the body of woman was
capitalism’s greatest invention, Leopoldina Fortunati
(1995) suggests that “free” emotional and domestic
labour underpin the project of capitalist productivity.
The body of woman itself becomes a machine for
reproducing labour powers: a site where production
and reproduction find their most “natural” expres-
sion. Distinguishing labour from work in accordance
with post- Fordist feminist writing (Weeks 2007;
Federici 2012, 20), we recall Silvia Federici’s claim
that in order to remember what love is, we must
first define work.
Automatic woman
M. Norton Wise (2007) claims that while human-like
automata of the eighteenth century were equally male
and female, those of the nineteenth century were
most often female, children or non-European (163).
These subjects were perceived to have qualities align-
ing them with primitivism, characterised by qualities
of emotion and irrationality, in contrast to their white
European paternalist authors and inventors. The
demarcation of such groups as the medium for
human-like automata signified the state of nature
and even “humanness” from which man had elevated
himself. In what follows, I will look at several early
speaking automata that functioned to naturalise capa-
cities associated with othered bodies, particularly of
women. It will be seen that the speaking automata is
conversant with wider ideas about the capacities and
qualities of women in general, especially her ability to
imitate and be functional.
In 1791, Farkas Kempelen demonstrated a rudi-
mentary, ungendered speaking machine designed as
an aide for the deaf (Brackhane and Trouvain 2011;
Felderer and Strouhal 2007). Made of wood, metal,
leather, rubber and an ivory reed, it spoke with the
voice of a child (Brackhane and Trouvain 2011) as if
to demonstrate the relative infancy of its technical
achievement and to reiterate the naturalised familial
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unions which were the essence of being human in
bourgeois society. Thus, despite its motherless origin,
at public demonstrations the speaking machine
would begin by uttering primary words such as
“Mama” and “Papa” (Riskin 2003, 619). Later in
Kempelen’s demonstration, the audience could sug-
gest phrases for the device to repeat. Notable among
these, the machine was heard to utter, “You are my
friend, I love you with all my heart” (ibid). What
makes proclamations of love by machines so poign-
ant is not only the desire to humanise machines, but
the underlying desire of man to humanise “man.”
Indeed, it has been noted that automata came to
reflect advancing modes of modern governance and
public administration in which man became the
potential automaton that must fit the new bureau-
cratic order (Felderer and Strouhal 2007). Small won-
der then, that machines were invested with the
promise of love as if to integrate the qualities most
associated with humanisation back into such a sys-
tem. That machines might love and be loved indicates
not only the potential humanization of machine-like
bureaucratic systems, but the potential humanization
of those who, by subjugating others, are themselves
dehumanized.
In 1845, a second talking machine made its debut
in New York city, this time as a musical instrument-
cum-cabinet, bearing the carefully sculpted head of a
female mannequin. In keeping with a taste for auto-
mata that embodied otherness, Joseph Faber’s
Euphonia followed a prior machine that had famously
featured a carved Turk as its ventriloquized subject.
While the Turk simulated playing chess,1 Euphonia
demonstrated speech through its most idealised chat-
terbox in a literal example of instrumentalised femi-
ninity. A curious hybrid of instrument and furniture
Euphonia’s ornate legs carved the space beneath her
like a bizarre domesticated animal. The machine was
operated by a keyboard and bellows that pumped air
to manipulate a series of plates and chambers, as
observed and recorded by Joseph Henry, who noted
16 levers or keys:
‘… like those of a piano projected sixteen elementary
sounds by which ‘every word in all European lan-
guages can be distinctly produced.’ A seventeenth
key opened and closed the equivalent of the glottis,
an aperture between the vocal cords. ‘The plan of the
machine is the same as that of the human organs of
speech, the several parts being worked by strings and
levers instead of tendons and muscles.’ (Millikan,
n.d.).
Not only did Euphonia reflect a wish for feminine
compliance in systems of patriarchy, she also evinced
the aspiration for remote speech so critical to systems
of telephony and computing. Her disembodied voice
has become synonymous with automated communi-
cation systems and their female operatives: whether
of the telephone operator or latterly the (often fem-
inised) digital assistant. Anticipating the invention of
the telephone, Henry ruminated that Faber’s inven-
tion could be imagined in connection with the tele-
graph: “The keys could be worked by means of
electro-magnetic magnets and with a little contri-
vance not difficult to execute words might be spoken
at one end of the telegraphic line which have their
origin at the other” (ibid).
Not only could Euphonia be “played” by her author,
indicative of loving subjects contrived by gentleman
scholars (one might think of My Fair Lady as one
infamous cinematic trope), but her ghoulish appear-
ance bears testament to the more grotesque aspects of
cosmetic intervention that continue to characterise
women’s ideal appearance to this day.
Euphonia is an illustration of the flow and control
of industrial processes, being a conglomeration of
materials that indicate the politics of trade. For exam-
ple, before they had uttered their first syllable, the lips
of Euphonia spoke much about the importance of
rubber in the imperial project. Rubber plantations
in India, the Congo and China would become as
notorious for the violence of their forced labour as
the German war camps that latterly kept Hitler’s war
machine in its essential supply of rubber. John Tully
(2011) notes that rubber was among a handful of
commodities upon which modern mechanised war-
fare depended (17). The image of trees being milked
for their rubber by indigenous slaves under imperial
rule presents nature as a fickle mother whose nutri-
ents grow nation states with unequal access to indus-
trial processes and military might. Indeed, the
marriage of mother and nature has long conspired
to turn both over to the interests of paternal steward-
ship: the labours of women and nature represent the
place where automated industry and life itself merge
into potential cycles of endless reproduction. In 1939,
the president of Goodyear tyres would suggest we:
Think of our industrial structure as a living thing,
the skeleton of which is composed of metal and
cement, the arterial system of which carries a life
stream of oil, and the flexing muscles and sinews of
which are rubber (Litchfield in Tully 2011, 17).
This description of a mechanised system as a living
body chimes well with the notion that Euphonia was
the ideal diagram of the industrial machine-woman,
where strings and levers replace tendons and muscles.
Today, strings and levers are replaced by silicone and
electronics, yet the latest permutations of novel
female automata have advanced surprisingly little.
Crucially, the automaton-woman is a metaphor not
only for Marx’s commodity fetish, but for the ways in
which women’s agency could be imagined away by
technical systems that were credited to male inven-
tion. Furthermore, we will see that the value of
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labour, skill, calculation and even intelligence, are
seen to alter historically according to who performs
them. When tasks associated with intellect become
the labour of women, they are often deskilled and
associated with abilities that are innate and auto-
matic. Thus, the figure of woman will be seen to be
the automatic operative par excellence.
The clichéd tenets of binarised, gender identity can
be traced to the natural sciences of the nineteenth
century where we find allusions to women’s suitability
in appending the machines of industry. Charles Darwin
himself is noted for aligning women with powers of
intuition, rapid perception and imitation (Daston
1992, 227). Such faculties were ascribed to “the lower
races and therefore of a past and lower state of civiliza-
tion” (Darwin in Norton Wise 2007, 180). Rhythm was
believed to be the evolutionary basis for imitation, a
capacity that also extends “low down in the animal
scale”’ (Wells in Norton Wise 2007, 180). Associated
with such traits, a capacity for repetition meant that
women excelled in tasks associated with memory and
the ability to learn, where learning was associated with
“taming” that led to “docility” and “pliability” as well as
mutability, being that they were believed to lack the
capacity for independent reasoning (Daston 1992,
215–216). In this way, women could be perceived as
auxiliary databases whose task was simply to store and
reiterate instruction, providing a means of agency that
would animate non-human machines. In support of
this functionality, Daston states that when calculation
was performed by women, it was associated with man-
ual and autonomous function, stripped of any associa-
tion with intelligence (1994, 195). For the infamous
English statistician and eugenicist, Francis Galton
(1822–1911), laborious work was the product of “nat-
ural ability” rather than any mastery of skill (in Daston
1992, 212). It is notable that proximity to nature, as
nature itself, is conceptualised by those who have an
exclusive claim upon culture and education. In seeming
to lack discernible qualities of intelligence or active will,
women were on the side of nature rather than culture.
Such capacities have obvious benefits in a system of
industry where factory and domestic labour are based
upon repetitive tasks and bodies that are no more than
mechanisms of industry.
Only once automated systems reduced tasks to
mechanical function and workers to anonymous,
replacable operatives, could women flourish in the
work-place. The wider deskilling attached to female
labour in systems of increasing automation meant
that women became entirely interchangeable with the
technical objects that facilitated their entry into the
labour market. Friedrich Kittler (1999) has elaborated
upon the interchangeability of machine and woman.
As with Sadie Plant’s coupling of feminization and
automation (1998, 39), Kittler sees that sexual innova-
tion is linked with technical innovation, seen in the
shift from literary to informational culture in the nine-
teenth century (Kittler 1999, 183). In Kittler’s example,
the typewriter initially referred to both a typing
machine and a woman who types. This conflation of
woman and technical object is synonymous with the
moment when writing shifts from being the work of
professional male secretaries who wrote long-hand, to
female workers who transcribed on keyboards (ibid).
Typists were reliant upon manual dexterity rather than
intellect or education, perpetuating the idea of women
as robotic drones (ibid 186). The ability to transcribe
and copy with speed and accuracy were considered
attributes particular to women, in keeping with narra-
tives about their innate capacity for imitation. The
rhythmic tapping of the typewriter keyboard itself
reminds us of women’s association with imitation
and reproduction. Yet once the keyboard becomes
associated with the digital economy, its labours
become associated with the masculine capacities of
programming, coding, and with an ingenious corpo-
rate identity that is exclusively the domain of men.
Indeed, the term computer was initially used to
describe those employed to carry out onerous calcula-
tions for professional mathematicians, astronomers
and military operations and were often women
(Grier 2005; 7; Light 1999, 461). Before the advent of
digital computing devices during the First and Second
World Wars, increasing numbers of women were
employed as computers to work on a range of ballistics
and military communication problems, including the
calculation of firing tables used for precision bombing
(Plant 1998, 145). Plant reminds us that the women
deployed to compute missile trajectories would soon
be employed to assemble components of electronic
computers to do the task of computing in their place
(ibid 146). Only lately, for example, in the movie:
Hidden Figures, Theodore Melfi’s (2016) Hollywood
adaptation of the book by Margot Lee Shetterly
(2016), has women’s expertise in fields of computation
been recognized beyond the research of a few dedi-
cated scholars. Yet, the fact that women programmed
the first computing machines such as ENIAC
(Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was
somewhat eclipsed by the notion of them fulfilling a
pre-ordained script that was ultimately the invention
of men. In these ways, women’s achievements were
continually undermined by paternalist social structures
that claimed authorship of technical systems and
endowed them with value. We have seen that even
notions of intelligence could alter in favour of those
with most power as a means of retaining the status
quo. Calculation performed by digital computers could
be recognised as a result of man’s capacity for inven-
tiveness, its autonomous efficiency rendering women’s
auxiliary function null and obsolete.
The dream of creating the ideal automaton-
woman is a perpetuation of privilege that naturalizes
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inequality and forms of paternal subservience. That
women were associated with the repetition and inter-
nalization of narratives authored by men- which was
also their subjugation- meant that their very labour
could alter the value of tasks that were uncoupled
from intelligence. Women were functionaries whose
labours were seen to underwrite the primacy and
intellect of male authorship.
The logic of the heart
Before exploring the capacity for literary imitation
and internalisation further, I want to define the
term automatic more succinctly, particularly the way
in which its meaning has evolved since its first use in
1749. What are the origins of this word that can
disappear chains of causality and legions of workers,
attributing action to objects that are “Livelier than its
operators”? (Leslie 2002, 90).
A relatively modern word, the term automatic is
preceded by the Ancient Greek automaton indicating
that which is self-acting (Harper 2017a). In Greek
mythology, automaton referred to the inventions of
Hephaestus, among them Talos, the bronze giant who
watched over Crete and Europa. Standing in fire until
his body became burning hot, Talos would embrace
his enemies who were incinerated instantly against
his chest: the automata’s potential for tenderness is
manifest as an indifference to violence. It is some-
what fitting then to learn that the Greek automatos
refers to that which is accidental or “without apparent
cause,” (Harper 2017a.). During the seventeenth cen-
tury, automata described not only moving devices
imitative of humans, but machines that functioned
according to code (Soanes and Stevenson 2004, 89). It
was the English physician and philosopher, David
Hartley, who first used the term automatic as an
adjective in 1749 to refer to the involuntary motions
of bodies:
The motions of the body are of two kinds, automatic
and voluntary. The automatic Motions are those
which arise from the mechanism of the body in an
evident manner. They are called automatic, from
their resemblance to the motions of automata, or
machines, whose principle motion is within them-
selves. Of this kind are the motion of the heart and
peristaltic motion of the bowels (Hartley 1749,
iii–iv).
These automatic motions are homeostatic: as a heart
beats, the alternation of contraction and relaxation is
maintained and modified in response to the needs
and experiences of the organism (ibid 100). It is
interesting to consider the evolution of the automatic
from organic bodies to machines. The quality of
automatic function is different in each case, being
that one is man-made and generally limited by
human operatives, and the other describes innate
qualities associated with forms of life. Yet it is man-
made machines that are considered to characterise
and precede the organic systems that invent them
after their own image.
During the modern period, automatic came to
describe actions that were not only involuntary, but
both unconscious and necessary (Soanes and
Stevenson 2004, 89). Here we can begin to infer the
machines necessary to industrial society, as well as the
unconscious desires and motivations that made them
appear necessary. We can trace such terms in emer-
gent forms of social psychology during the latter part
of the twentieth century, concerned with automaticity
in mental processes. If social behaviour, judgement
and motivation were themselves unconscious and
automatic, might it be possible to deliberately stimu-
late unintentional behaviour? (Bargh 2007, 2).
In ancient Greek autos was a reflexive pronoun
meaning “self, same”, and was used as a prefix to
proper names, such as “‘autoMelinna’ meaning
Melinna herself” (Harper 2017b.). Autoritratto, or
self-portrait, became a significant genre of painting
in renaissance Italy, at a period when the word “fash-
ion” became a verb in English, referring to the plas-
ticity of identity (see Woods-Marsden 1998, 15). The
autos of self, highlights the ways in which the subject
emerges as a novel form of reflexivity during the early
modern period. Notable in this historical corollary is
the movement from the automaton as “self-acting” to
the autos of the “acting-self”; and from the automatic
as the involuntary to the more Freudian positing of
unconscious necessity as that which governs the
modern subject. Today, we are used to the automatic
referring to non-human devices that rationalize forms
of human labour and extend human capacities
beyond the body. Automation also marks the redis-
tribution of labour throughout social and global sys-
tems, as well as the way in which certain types and
class of body can be reasoned away within these
systems. In fact, automatic processes might better be
considered the products and agents of distinct mate-
rial events that attempt to do away with causality. In
this respect, we can recall that love too, relies upon an
obfuscation of material, causal features. It is notable
that love as a literary device is often typified by its
fatalism, whereby behaviours and actions seem to
happen of their own accord. Thus, we often speak
of love as fate, or destiny but at the same time, as
being predicated upon coincidence and chance. What
these terms have in common is their non-negotiable
status as events, and a relation to retrospective justi-
fication that appears to be prior to, and to replace,
their actual causes.
Kittler interestingly alludes to the imitative function of
young women via German literature in the 1800s, where
the reading, repetition and internalisation of romantic
narratives by male authors served to make love appear
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a priori—a background that preceded language and was
akin to nature itself (Kittler 1999, 73). For Kittler, nature,
woman and love would constitute a web of shifting sig-
nificance in the nineteenth century; a set of interchange-
able values that were defined by essential and
unchangeable features. There are a number of ways in
which these terms might be seen to triangulate to rein-
force patriarchal values, being that each individually has
the potential to question and overturn male primacy.
While women and nature were the objects of appropria-
tion and colonisation, love could help to make these
appropriations seem inevitable and natural. By consign-
ing women, nature and love to an essence characterised
by irrationality and instability, each lent itself to exploita-
tion and appropriation. For example, the fact that unpre-
dictability and changeability are associated with women
and nature is seen in the context of an essential character
that demonstrates the need for further domestication. If
love was the basis for this domestication then, in keeping
with romantic poetry, it served to fulfil the essential
conditions already attributed to women as we will see
in what follows.
That the terms love, nature and woman were synon-
ymous lends weight to the idea that modern romantic
love and woman had become exempt from other social,
material or economic considerations and were asso-
ciated with the natural. I want to further demonstrate
this naturalisation in romantic fiction typical of the
period. Kittler (1990) uses the work of Goethe to exem-
plify the sort of poetry recited by young German
women in order to educate them in the ways of love.
Goethe’s Faust [1831] is salient to our cause here
because love and woman feature as the repositories of
authenticity and nature. This authenticity- and that of
fiction as fiction- must be protected from any associa-
tion with capitalist circulation or the ways in which
rarefied modes of authenticity themselves create
unquestionable forms of value. Love, and the women
that signify it, must remain unconscious of their part in
the wider systemic function of romance in order that
this authenticity remains intact, as Goethe reminds us:
Ah! That singleness of heart
And absence of all artifice-
Gifts, as they are, above all price,
Heavens holiest blessing- should be thus
Of their own worth unconscious!
That meekness, gentleness and treasure
Which nature, who doth still impart
To all in love and lavish measure
Gives to the child, whom she loves dearest… (Goethe
1988, 171).
Love’s traits must necessarily be unconscious of their
own worth, giving rise to features associated with an
authenticity characterized by acquiescence (meekness
and gentleness). The wish for reproductive acquies-
cence, both in the text and regarding the body of the
woman, extend the “feminine” into a condition of
idealized nature, which is also one of moral agency
to be rewarded or blessed. Faust claims that love and
woman must remain unconscious of their value, in
order to function “naturally,” which might rather be
understood as according to the logic of male authors.
In this manner, women retain their affinity with
processes that assume an unconscious position in
regard to patriarchal interest.
According to Ole Høystad (2007), Goethe’s writing
is paradigmatic at a historical moment when feelings
and agency are features of internalization and indivi-
duation (ibid 206). Goethe was a key innovator of
“Western metaphorics” for whom the symbolism of
the heart became “so [saturated] with polysemic and
polyphonic meaning … that it goes beyond the limits
of metaphorics and regains the nature of the symbol”
(Høystad 2007, 205–206). Indeed, the symbolization
of the heart as love’s locus in poetic language further
prevents love from being understood as a form of
material labour even as it indicates the locus of life. In
the twentieth century, the feminist Carla Lonzi
claimed that love’s symbolic quality was in keeping
with patriarchal values that disenfranchised women
from love as experience, and objectified it:
Women give love an independent value, while men
give it an instrumental one. ‘Men […] recuperate this
love as an absolute value in the arts, in poetry, in the
artworks that live and grow through these non-
relationships. Therefore men, after preventing
[women] from living love, offer to them its symbol
as an object.’ (Lonzi in Fontaine 2013)
In other words, the material qualities and labour
associated with love become the burden of women
beyond the symbolic attributions that have long been
the concern of paternal authorship. This authorship
has simply made an art of naturalising love’s labours
as the work of women.
Love’s labours
Evoking the erotic love of Goethe’s Faust, Marx
claimed that the capitalist transferal of living labour
into lifeless objects is a process whereby an animate
monster works “as if its body were by love possessed”
(Marx 1990, 302). Matter and production are made
monstrous, invested with the qualities of romantic
love that animate the otherwise mortifying system
of commodity production. Capitalism has long
aspired to the automatic flows and functions of bod-
ily vitality. The throb and circulation of capitalist
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production has no organ than the workers own heart-
and this heartbeat, claimed Marx, is appropriated by
the machines of capitalist production (Marx 1990,
343). We return to the symbol of the heart as one
associated with both vitality and love, and by a mate-
rial, physical function that is characterised by auto-
maticity. Unlike a body made happily animate by the
continuous flow of commodities imagined by the
president of Goodyear tyres (above) here, objects
are gripped by an animate monstrosity that apes the
physiological effects of romantic love. In turn,
romantic love’s disposition as a state of nature is
subject to appropriation and corruption. This posses-
sion, which might also be described as a colonization
reflects the appropriation of labour and resources
that are suppressed beneath the grandiose image of
machines made lively and loving.
For Max Weber (2009) love’s relation to capitalist
production is a less ambiguous than one posed by
Marx. Love’s apparent irrationality was posited as a
strategy that could rationalize the world of work in
industrialisation. Love and eroticism were elevated to
a realm of sublime conscious enjoyment during the
nineteenth century, appearing “like a gateway into the
most irrational and thereby real kernel of life as
compared with the mechanisms of rationalization”
(Weber 2009, 345). The limitless giving of the self,
associated with love, was radically opposed to “func-
tionality, rationality, and generality,” and imparted as
the unique meaning of a specific other:
[…] The lover realises himself to be rooted in the
kernal of the truly living, which is eternally inacces-
sible to any rational endeavor. He allows himself to
be freed from the cold skeletal hands of rational
orders, just as completely as from the banality of
everyday routine (Weber 2009, 347).
While seeming to pitch itself against work and
machine, love is a palliative that obfuscates and
reproduces forms of servitude, such as factory labour.
At the time Weber was writing, there was only one
accepted form of love- the heterosexuality that bound
individuals to families and nation in a tacit agreement
with the norms imposed upon them. Weber’s obser-
vation that erotic love was a reconnection to a wild
and irrational nature serves as part of the capitalist
systems overall calculation that utilizes the romantic
predisposition of the nineteenth century. It may also
remind us of the way in which automatic function
aspired to appropriate the very nature of living
organisms.
That women’s labours and bodies were disap-
peared by their apparent desire to work for love
alone is a point that has been made by a number of
scholars over the past 5 decades, particularly those
who highlight the exclusion of women’s labour from
critical accounts of capitalist production, for example
Firestone (2015), Federici (2012, 2014), Hester
(2016), and Fortunati (1995). Like Weber,
Leopoldina Fortunati (1995) examines the way in
which the irrational, incalculable tenets of love have
been used to give rational form to capitalist interest,
making working life and the invisible labour of
women in particular, seem part of a natural life
cycle. In her radical polemic, Fortunati (1995) under-
stands love to be the very mask and engine of capi-
talist production. The traditional female house-worker
performs invisible labour being that her work is
neither named nor waged (ibid 101). The unit of
the family is seen to precede the factory, while the
acceleration of mechanised factory labour has a direct
effect upon all work processes (ibid 119). In these
terms, even the house-worker is indirectly subject to
factory discipline and must carry out her work with a
“continuity, regularity and intensity…” unparalleled
by pre-capitalist modes of production (ibid). In this
sense, the woman is a machine indiscernible from
industrial mechanisms. Fortunati claims that capital
is deemed to have “transformed the woman’s body
with its natural capacities to produce individuals into
a machine for producing labour-powers”, so that she
is “a machine in the continuous cycle of non- mate-
rial production” (ibid 72, 77).
Women’s “naturalised” suitability to unwaged
labour was not the only feature that made her amen-
able to mechanisation. Fortunati draws on Marx’s
notion that the first effect of capitalist machinery
was to attract the waged labour of women, being
that women generally provided “a more malleable
work instrument,” than their male counterparts
(ibid 168). Not only did machinery do away with
the need for brute muscle power, it often required a
suppleness that could be supplied by women and
children, who, needing less to sustain them, could
be paid less for doing the same work (ibid). This
unfortunate application of industrial logic seems to
have remained pervasive in many European contexts,
even after industrialisation. Fortunati’s thesis reflects
wider post-Fordist anxieties about the value of so-
called invisible labour, as well as the difference
between labour and work. Such a distinction might
be helpful in considering the particular use of labour
here. Kathi Weeks (2007) highlights the fact that
1970s socialist feminism helped to recapitulate all
forms of labour as forms of work, when work was
still “equated with the waged production of material
goods” (235). Work indicates a contractual or waged
subset of labour, while labour encompasses all forms
of production, whether waged or unwaged. Given the
valorisation of waged-work over other forms of
labour since the industrial period, it is worth consid-
ering the realm of affective labour. In its broadest
sense, affective labour, refers to that which sustains
social relations via forms of housework and care
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work, most usually ascribed to women. While stand-
point feminism of the 1970 and 1980s directed its
concern to the domain of affect, Silvia Federici claims
that affect re-mystifies the feminist analysis of work,
being that we return to vague allusions of feeling and
emotion rather than concrete forms of material work,
and that these vagaries were once referred to as the
labours of love (Federici 2010, 24). We have noted
that qualities of emotion and feeling themselves are
often attributed to those who have the least power in
social systems. Whether women, children, non- Euro-
American subjects, or the lower classes, those that are
easily objectified can also be more easily dismissed
(Lutz 1986, 292). Elsewhere, Federici cites a respon-
dent who claims that work should be named as such
in order that we might rediscover what love is
(Federici 2012, 20). Perhaps the aim should not be
to reduce all labour to a capitalist exchange, but to
acknowledge how concepts of love’s labours have
been consigned to unacknowledged necessity, whilst
functioning to keep certain bodies outside of power.
Rather than a symbol that evinces vague notions of
emotion and feeling, we might reconsider love a
realm of material production and a form of life,
acknowledging the labour that must be continually
expended in order to sustain it rather than presup-
posing a reserve of automatically generated benefi-
cence. Love perhaps continues to endure as a sign
because it presupposes no sake but its own and
because its status as a signifier is so mercurial. That
women have long worked in the service of love has
aligned their labour with natural inclination rather
than with multiple forms of production and repro-
duction that include tedious, necessary toil. In this
manner, such labour retains invisibility and is deva-
lued because it is perceived to be the result of natural
necessity, which is to say, impulses that can be
deemed as automatic as a heartbeat.
Conclusion
Niklas Luhmann (1998) suggested that during the
eighteenth century, “the other” becomes a set of
functions relating to the self (25). We can infer
that this “other” refers to the idealised figure of
woman, expected to assume a range of functions
in response to the overtures of the male subject.
Luhmann suggests that love could help to fore-
ground the individual against a psychic landscape
that had subsumed all other aspects of the environ-
ment into itself (ibid 15). In this case, the ego
becomes locus of inner experience whilst the envir-
onment “loses most of its contours” (ibid). This
subsumption reminds us of Marx’s monstrous vital-
ity that is created out of appropriated bodies and
resources. Aspects of the environment become little
more than symbols and signs that are experienced
as the romantic subject’s interior life. The unique
attributes of the beloved as functions directed
toward the self, support the cause of individualism
above all others, and become a defining feature of
Westernized democracies in the global North. Such
prioritizing of individuality assumes agency not
only over the immediate environment, but natura-
lizes the appropriation of lands reducible to a psy-
chic contour in the project of colonisation. In these
terms, the privileging of individual interest over the
environment is powerfully reinforced by romantic
attachment.
That both woman and nature were figured as
machine-like in the industrial period sanctioned the
exploitation of either in the service of inexhaustible
industrialization. Furthermore, love and woman were
idealised as natural rather than cultural, cementing
women’s propensity for functional, automatic pro-
cesses that were not reliant upon education, auton-
omy or invention.
In the heterosexual orthodoxy of industrialisation,
women represented the fetishized and overvalued
qualities of the commodity that turned them into
romantic objects of fascination, curiosity and poetry.
Euphonia recalls the dancing table of Marx, whose
grotesque animation expresses the sum of labour
relations between men and their “socio- natural”
properties2. Love, in its capacity to automate social
systems and disappear the bodies that constitute its
labours, is engineered toward patriarchy’s distant
dream of its own humanisation. Let us remember
that this seeming automation has often been reliant
upon the invisibility of women’s labour. The suppres-
sion of their own fury in its regard can be seen as a
placeholder for men’s own invisibility to themselves;
invisibility as human subjects with an equal claim
upon emotional life and love.
Today, the automatic is associated with non-
human systems that expedite the alchemical transfor-
mation of the world’s resources into economic pro-
ductivity, as well as with the coming of a robotic
workforce. Yet the origin of the “automatic” is barely
remembered, being perhaps, that it draws attention to
the complex organic bodies behind the novel
machines and devices that appear to automate social
relations.
The digital economy continues the process of
“automating” geographical, class-based and racial
borders: its systems and devices obfuscating the
materials and bodies that constitute the exploited
labour key to its production. Although we are aware
of such practices, the bodies that are put to work
within these systems become automatic in every
sense of the word. That is, they are the unconscious
but necessary features of global capital whose subjec-
tion is the true face of a deeply embedded nationalis-
tic love of one’s own kind at the expense of all others.
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1. Later discovered to be “directed by human chess
players ingeniously concealed in its pedestal.” (Riskin
2003, 621).
2. The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a table is made
out of it… as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it
changes… It not only stands with its feet on the ground,
but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its
head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas,
far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its
own free will… Themysterious character of the commod-
ity-form consists therefore, simply in the fact that the
commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s
own labour as objective characteristics of the products of
labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these
things’ (Marx 1990, 163–165).
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